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In the world of Philo studies, relatively few have ventured into the territory of “Philo and 
the Dead Sea Scrolls”. Some notable exceptions include comparative studies on the 
Essenes;
1 the work of Lawrence Schiffman and others on the interpretation of biblical 
law in the Dead Sea Scrolls and Philo;
2 and Hindy Najman’s work on “Mosaic 
discourse”.
3 Another study is the contribution of James Kugel to the present volume. The 
2007 volume of The Studia Philonica Annual, the journal dedicated to the study of Philo, 
made a rallying call for more attention to this field with a collection of studies on shared 
themes in Philo’s writings and the scrolls.
4 Introducing the volume, John J. Collins 
observed that  
 
No one wishes to deny that Philo and the Scrolls remain very different. But they 
also have much in common. They have a common basis in the Torah and its 
                                                 
1 See, for example, the recent study by Joan E. Taylor, “Philo of Alexandria on the Essenes: A Case Study 
on the Use of Classical Sources in Discussions of the Qumran-Essene Hypothesis,” in David T. Runia and 
Gregory E. Sterling, eds., The Studia Philonica Annual: Studies in Hellenistic Judaism Vol. 19 (2007), 1–
28. 
2 Lawrence H. Schiffman, Sectarian Law in the Dead Sea Scrolls, Courts, Testimony, and the Penal Code 
(Chico: Scholars Press, 1983); idem, “The Prohibition of Judicial Corruption in the Dead Sea Scrolls, Philo, 
Josephus and Talmudic Law,” in Ḥeṣed ve-Emet: Studies in Honor of Ernest S. Frerichs (ed. Jodi Magness 
and Seymour Gitin; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998), 155–78; cf. David Rokeah, “The Temple Scroll, Philo, 
Josephus, and the Talmud,” in JTS 34 (1983): 515–26. 
3 Hindy Najman, Seconding Sinai: The Development of Mosaic Discourse in Second Temple Judaism 
(JSJSup 77; Leiden: Brill, 2003).  
4 “Special Section: Philo and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” in SPhilo 19 (2007): 81–142.   2 
interpretation. They may also have some common exegetical traditions, although 
much remains to be explored in this regard.
5  
 
My purpose in this study is to offer a small contribution to this field of 
exploration. The overall goal is to understand Philo’s work in the commentaries On the 
Special Laws (De Specialibus Legibus), and to try to situate Philo’s interpretations of 
biblical law in the wider context of ancient traditions of biblical interpretation. The 
particular example to be examined here focuses on Philo’s interpretation of the 
prohibition of single testimony, a rule that appears in three different statements in the 
books of Numbers and Deuteronomy (Num 35:30; Deut 17:6; 19:15). My discussion of 
Philo’s treatment of these texts begins with a brief introduction to the prohibition of 
single testimony in the Pentateuch, as represented by the Masoretic Text and LXX.  
In relation to Philo, the key questions to be examined are these: What does Philo 
do with the prohibition of single testimony? How does Philo’s interpretation relate to the 
statements in the Pentateuch? Why does Philo link the prohibition of single testimony to 
the “Ninth Commandment” in the Decalogue, the prohibition of false testimony (Exod 
20:16; Deut 5:20)? In many respects, Philo’s interpretation here, as in so many other 
points, stands apart from anything else that survives of early Jewish sources. But, in what 
follows, I would also like to suggest that there is a case here for making connections to 
other exemplars of early Judaism, including, in particular, the Temple Scroll. 
 
The Pentateuch and the prohibition of single testimony 
                                                 
5 John J. Collins, “Introduction,” in SPhilo 19 (2007): 81–84, at 84.   3 
The Pentateuch includes various laws dealing with witnesses and their testimony. 
Traditions in Exodus deal primarily with false testimony (Exod 20:16; 22:7–8; 23:1–2, 
7), and these are repeated or developed in Deuteronomy (Deut 5:20; 19:16–21). 
Deuteronomy also offers a distinctive contribution to this area with the prohibition of 
single testimony (Deut 17:6; 19:15). In the context of Ancient Near Eastern law, this 
prohibition appears for the first time in the Pentateuch.
6  
 
1) Deut 17:2–7 
In Deut 17, the prohibition of single testimony is connected to the prosecution of 
apostates (Deut 17:2–7), and forms part of a series of statements dealing with the local 
resolution of judicial matters in “one of the cities that the Lord your God is giving you” 
(17:2; cf. 16:18–20; 17:8–13). The matter in question concerns the case of an individual, 
man or woman, who is found to have worshipped and bowed down to “other gods”, to the 
sun, moon or “any of the heavenly host” (17:3). The offender is defined emphatically as 
one who offends against God: “a man or a woman who does evil in the sight of the Lord 
your God, transgressing His covenant”; the worship of “other gods”, something “which I 
did not command” (17:3). In contrast with Deut 13:7–12, which allows summary 
execution of the apostate, based on an accusation by one person who also initiates the 
execution, the statement of Deut 17:2–7 represents a marked degree of restraint in 
procedure.
7 The law insists that any report of apostasy must be investigated thoroughly, 
and the penalty of execution by stoning is to be carried out only when the fact of apostasy 
                                                 
6 For further discussion of this area, see Bruce Wells, The Law of Testimony in the Pentateuchal Codes 
(Wiesbaden: Harassowitz Verlag, 2004). 
7 For detailed discussion of Deut 17:2–7 as a revision of Deut 13:7–12: see Bernard M. Levinson, 
Deuteronomy and the Hermeneutics of Legal Innovation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 98–
143 (118–23).   4 
has been established (17:4–5). The law also sets out the specific conditions required for 
the application of the death penalty: 
 
6. According to the testimony
8 of two witnesses     6. On the basis of two witnesses or on the  
or three witnesses, the one who is to die shall die;  basis of three witnesses, the one who is to 
he shall not die according to the testimony of a  die shall die; he shall not die on the basis 
single witness             of a single witness (ἐπὶ δυσὶν µάρτυσιν ἢ  
תמה תמוי םידע השלש וא םידע םינש יפ לע)  ἐπὶ τρισὶν µάρτυσιν ἀποθανεῖται ὁ 
(דחא דע יפ לע תמוי אל      ἀποθνῄσκων˙ οὐκ ἀποθανεῖται ἐφ’ ἑνὶ 
7. The hand of the witnesses shall be the first against   µάρτυρι). 
him to put him to death, and the hand of all the                  7. And the hand of the witnesses 
people afterwards; and you shall remove the  shall be the first against him to put him to 
evil from among you.           death, and the hand of all the people last; 
(MT Deut 17:6–7)          and you shall remove the evil man from 
              among you. 
              (LXX Deut 17:6–7) 
 
                    
                         
The prohibition of single testimony serves to support the law’s insistence on a thorough 
investigation to establish the case for the death penalty for alleged apostates. The positive 
demand for “two…or three witnesses” emphasises that two witnesses constitute the 
minimum requirement, explicitly ruling out the sufficiency of single testimony in such 
cases.
9 In comparison with the treatment of apostasy in Deut 13:7–12, the introduction of 
the prohibition of single testimony in Deut 17:2–7 looks like a conscious correction of 
earlier procedure, a “transformation” of the law, as Bernard Levinson puts it, which 
stresses “the priority of witness law over summary execution”.
10  
 
2) Deut 19:15 
                                                 
8 Lit. “according to the mouth of”, i.e. “according to the evidence of” (cf. Deut 19:15; 21:5). The Hebrew 
idiom directs attention to the mouth (הפ), i.e. the verbal statement or oral testimony of the witnesses (cf. 
HALOT 3, 915). 
9 Bernard S. Jackson, Essays in Jewish and Comparative Legal History (Leiden: Brill, 1975), 153–71. 
10 Levinson, Deuteronomy, 118.   5 
In Deut 19:15, the prohibition of single testimony is not confined to any particular case, 
such as the death penalty for apostates, but is presented as applicable to any kind of 
offence:  
 
A single witness shall not arise against a man  A single witness shall not remain
11 to witness 
for any wrongdoing or for any sin, with respect   against a man for any wrongdoing or for any 
to any offence that may be committed;
12    sin or for any offence that may be committed; 
on the evidence of two witnesses or on the    on the evidence
13 of two witnesses or on the     
the evidence of three witnesses       evidence of three witnesses shall any matter (or 
shall a matter (or word) be established.
14    word) be established. 
         
                    
       שיאב דחא דע םוקי אל  Οὐκ ἐµµενεῖ µάρτυς εἷς  µαρτυρῆσαι 
        אטחי רשא אטח לכב תאטח לכלו ןוע לכל  κατὰ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀδικίαν
15 
רבד םוקי םידע השלש יפ לע וא םידע ינש יפ לע  καὶ κατὰ  πᾶν ἁµάρτηµα
16 καὶ  κατὰ  πᾶσαν 
ἁµαρτίαν
17, ἣν ἂν ἁµάρτῃ|: 
            ἐπὶ στόµατος δύο µαρτύρων 
            καὶ  ἐπὶ στόµατος τριῶν µαρτύρων 
            σταθήσεται πᾶν ῥῆµα. 
 
(MT Deut 19:15)         (LXX Deut 19:15) 
 
                                                 
11 The peculiar expression ἐµµένω κατὰ τινος incorporates elements of a standard Greek formula for a 
prosecution speech, perhaps to give an air of authenticity and contemporary relevance to the description of 
judicial procedure in Deuteronomy. 
12 Modern translations offer a variety of different renderings for the Hebrew terms used to describe the 
context for this rule (ןוע; תאטח; אטחי רשא אטח), e.g. NJPS “any guilt or blame for any offense that may be 
committed”; NRSV “any crime or wrongdoing in connection with any offense that may be committed”;  
“for any sin or for any guilt, in any offence of which he may be guilty” (Jackson, Essays in Jewish and 
Comparative Legal History, 153); “any crime or any sin, with respect to any offense that one might 
commit” (Wells, The Law of Testimony, 103). In Deuteronomy, תאטח is primarily associated with cultic 
offences, while ןוע and )+x are connected with both secular and cultic wrongdoing (cf. Wells, The Law of 
Testimony, 103f.). LXX Deut also reflects a range of translation equivalents associated with these Hebrew 
terms (see below notes 14–16). 
13 Lit., “mouth”, replicating the Hebrew idiom. 
14 Alternatively, following Jackson, Essays, 153: ‘A single witness shall not arise…shall a matter arise’. 
15 In LXX Deut, ἀδικία = MT ןוע only here; cf. LXX Deut 5:9, ἁµαρτία = MT ןוע; LXX Deut 32:4, ἀδικία 
= לוע.  
16 In LXX Deut, ἁµάρτηµα = MT תאטח: Deut 9:27; 19:15; cf. LXX Deut 22:26, ἁµάρτηµα = MT אטח; 
LXX Deut 9:21, ἁµαρτία = MT אטח. 
17 In LXX Deut, ἁµαρτία = MT אטח: Deut 15:9; 19:15; 21:22; 23:22, 23; 24:15, 16; ἁµαρτία = MT תאטח: 
Deut 9:18, 21; ἁµαρτία = MT תובש: Deut 30:3.   6 
LXX goes further than the Hebrew of MT in making explicit that πᾶν ῥῆµα –any matter 
(or any word)—must be established on the basis of two or three witnesses, whereas MT 
states only that רבד—a matter (or a word)—must be established on that basis. The broad 
application of the prohibition of single testimony inspired the transfer of this rule to areas 
outside the field of law to the realm of rhetorical strategies and truth claims.
18 In the book 
of Deuteronomy, Deut 19:15 is followed directly by the case of false testimony brought 
by one man against another, and the thorough procedure to be followed to determine the 
integrity of the witness and to punish the false witness according to the strictest 
application of the principle of talion (Deut 19:16–21). In declaring that a single witness 
shall not “arise” (Mwqy )l), Deut 19:15 anticipates the danger of the false witness who, 
as stated in the very next verse, may “arise” (םוקי יכ ) (Deut 19:16).
19  The context thus 
implies that the prohibition of single testimony safeguards against wrongful convictions 
based on false evidence.
20 Of the two Deuteronomic formulations of the requirement for 
two or three witnesses, Deut 17:6 has perhaps the better claim to priority. Reform of the 
evidentiary process is likely to have been directed to capital cases before being applied 
more widely, as in Deut 19:15.
21 
 
3) Numbers 35:30 
                                                 
18 On transferred applications, see David Daube, “The Law of Witnesses in Transferred Operation,” 
JANESCU (1973): 91–93; idem, “Witnesses in Bible and Talmud,” Oxford Centre Papers (Oxford: Oxford 
Centre for Postgraduate Hebrew Studies, 1986), 3–20, esp. 17–20. 
19 This point is less clearly emphasised in LXX, which uses different verbs where the Hebrew equivalent 
has םוק in both contexts. 
20 Andrew D.H. Mayes, Deuteronomy (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981), 266, 289; Eckart Otto, Das 
Deuteronomium: politische Theologie und Rechtsreform in Juda und Assyrien (New York: De Gruyter, 
1999), 257–62; Wells, The Law of Testimony, 104. 
21 Mayes, Deuteronomy, 289; Daube, ‘Witnesses in Bible and Talmud’, 10–11. For an alternative 
interpretation, making Deut 19:15 prior to Deut 17:6: Udo Rüterswörden, Von der politischen 
Gemeinschaft zur Gemeinde. Studien zu Dt 16, 18–18,22 (Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum, 1987), 36f.   7 
Finally, in Num 35:30, the prohibition of single testimony is applied to the specific case 
of manslaughter: 
If anyone strikes a person,         If anyone strikes a person, you shall kill 
the killer may be killed only on the evidence     the killer by means of
22 witnesses, 
of witnesses; and a single witness        and a single witness shall not testify 
shall not testify against a person that      against a person that he should die. 
he should die. 
     שפנ הכמ לכ       πᾶς πατάξας ψυχήν,  
חצרה תא חצרי םידע יפל      διὰ µαρτύρων φονεύσεις 
        תומל שפנב הנעי אל דחא דעו      τὸν φονεύσαντα, 
              καὶ µάρτυς εἷς οὐ µαρτυρήσει 
              ἐπὶ ψυχὴν ἀποθανεῖν. 
 
(MT Num 35:30)           (LXX Num 35:30) 
 
Num 35:30 requires a plurality of witnesses, rather than Deuteronomy’s formula of “two 
or three witnesses” for the execution of the death penalty. 
   
Philo and the prohibition of single testimony 
What then does Philo have to say about the prohibition of single testimony? Like 
Josephus and others, Philo seems to have been inspired by Deut 19:15 to apply the 
demand for two or three witnesses to clinch an argument or prove a case, or in the terms 
of LXX Deut 19:15, any matter or any word.
23 In the treatise De Iosepho, Philo presents 
the patriarch Joseph as applying a series of three different tests which constitute 
“testimonies” to prove his estranged brothers’ faithfulness (Ios. 235).
24 Lawrence 
                                                 
22 Or “in the presence of”. 
23 Josephus, C. Ap. 2.218, 290; cf. Paul, 2 Corinthians 13:1–3. 
24 In De Iosepho, Philo retells the story of Joseph’s reunion with his long-estranged brothers who had once 
sold him into slavery, leading to his life in Egypt where he had risen to be Pharaoh’s number one man, 
presiding over Egypt’s food supplies (Ios. 163–267; Genesis 42–45). Faced with famine in Canaan, 
Joseph’s father Jacob had sent all but one of his remaining sons to Egypt to buy corn, thus bringing them 
face to face with Joseph. Only the youngest, Benjamin, Joseph’s full brother by their mother Rachel, 
remained at home. Philo follows the main points of the Genesis narrative: Joseph recognises his brothers,   8 
Schiffman has rightly compared this example of combining three separate testimonies to 
the principle of combining the evidence of three witnesses to separate offences in the 
laws of the Damascus Document (Columns 9–10).
25 
However, Philo’s only explicit discussion of the prohibition of single testimony is 
in Book Four of the Special Laws where he deals with the “special” or “particular” laws 
which he relates to the Ninth Commandment of the Decalogue, “You shall not bear false 
witness against your neighbour with a false testimony” (LXX Exod 20:16; Deut 5:20).  
Philo has a distinctive conception of the “Ten Words”, the commandments of the 
Decalogue, in relation to all the other laws of the Torah, as the head to the parts of the 
body, the general to the particular, the genus to the species (exemplified in the titles of 
the books of the Special Laws, Spec. 1.1; 2.1; 3.1; 4.1). Thus, the Ten Words are “heads 
summarizing the particular laws” (Decal. 19); “the main heads delivered by the voice of 
God” are “generic laws”, while “all particular laws of which Moses was the spokesman” 
are “dependent species” (Spec. 4.132), hence the English translation “Special Laws”.
26 
Philo also describes the Ten Words as “roots”, “sources” or “fountains” of the other laws 
                                                                                                                                                
but they do not recognise him; he decides to test their honesty, and accuses them of being spies (Gen 42:16, 
34); the brothers must prove themselves by a series of tests in which they have to bring Benjamin to Egypt 
and defend him from the threat of enslavement there. In Philo’s reading of Genesis, Joseph’s treatment of 
his brothers is meant to test their feelings towards Benjamin (Ios.232); to prove that the sons of Jacob and 
Leah feel no enmity towards their brother by a different mother, and that they do not intend to destroy what 
remains of Joseph’s immediate family. According to Philo, Joseph proves the brothers’ good faith by three 
trials or “testimonies”, the third of which is their response to the false accusation that Benjamin had stolen 
Joseph’s most precious cup (Ios. 232–36): 
 
…having already observed by two testimonies (µαρτυρίαις) that there was no smouldering enmity, 
[Joseph] thought up this third [testimony], namely to pretend that the cup had been stolen, and 
charge the theft to the youngest. For this would be the clearest way of testing the real feeling of 
each, and their attachment to the brother thus falsely accused (Ios.235; translation adapted from 
Francis H. Colson, Philo VI (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935, 1984)). 
 
25 Schiffman, Sectarian Law in the Dead Sea Scrolls, 78. 
26 See further Yehoshua Amir, “The Decalogue according to Philo,” in The Ten Commandments in History 
and Tradition (ed. Ben-Zion Segal and Gershon Levi; Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1990), 121–60; Cristina 
Termini, “Taxonomy of Biblical Laws and ΦΙΛΟΤΕXΝΙΑ in Philo of Alexandria: A Comparison with 
Josephus and Cicero,” SPhilo 16 (2004): 1–29.   9 
(Congr. 120). Every commandment of the Torah is therefore fundamentally connected, as 
part of a logically coherent whole, to the Ten Words. This conception underlies Philo’s 
elaborate treatment of the “particular” or “special” laws of the Torah in relation to their 
“heads” in the Ten Words, set out in great detail in four books, On the Special Laws. 
Nothing precisely like this is known from other sources for early Jewish Bible 
interpretation, though rabbinic sources may contain echoes of Philo’s grand plan of 
connecting each commandment to one of the Ten Words (y. Šeqal. 49d; Targum Pseudo-
Jonathan on Exod 24:12).
27  
Within this framework, Philo presents the prohibition of single testimony as a 
“special law” of the Ninth Commandment in the following terms: 
[Moses] added another very fine clause when he ordered that the witness of one 
person should not be accepted. Firstly, because it is possible that a single person 
may see something wrongly, mishear something, or be deceived; for false 
opinions are countless and they can attack from countless sides. Secondly, 
because it is most unjust to accept one witness against several or even against one: 
against several because they have a stronger claim to be believed than one; 
against one, since the witness has no advantage in number over him, and equality 
is incompatible with claiming advantage. For why should assent be given to the 
witness who differs from the other rather than to the one accused who speaks for 
himself? It is clearly best to suspend judgment where there is neither lack nor 
excess of evidence. (Special Laws 4.53–54) 
 
53	 ﾠΠάγκαλον µέντοι κἀκεῖνο προσδιετάξατο κελεύσας ἑνὸς µαρτυρίαν µὴ 
προσίεσθαι˙	 ﾠ πρῶτον µὲν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ἕνα καὶ παριδεῖν τι καὶ παρακοῦσαι καὶ 
παρενθυµηθῆναι καὶ ἀπατηθῆναι, δόξαι	 ﾠγὰρ αἱ ψευδεῖς µυρίαι καὶ ἀπὸ µυρίων	 ﾠ
εἰώθασι προσπίπτειν˙  54 δεύτερον δὲ ὅτι κατὰ πλείονων ἢ καὶ καθ’ ἑνὸς ἀδικώτατον 
<ἑνὶ> χρῆσθαι µάρτυρι, τῶν µὲν ὅτι δὴ πρὸς πίστιν ἀξιονικότεροι ἑνός, τοῦ δ’ ἐπειδὴ 
κατ’ ἀριθµὸν οὐ προφέρει, τὸ δ’ ἴσον πλεονεξίας ἀλλότριον˙ τί γὰρ µᾶλλον τῷ 
µάρτυρι καθ’ ἑτέρου διεξιόντι ἢ τῷ κατηγορουµένῳ ὑπὲρ αὑτοῦ λέγοντι συναινετέον; 
ἄριστον δ’ ὡς ἔοικεν ἐπέχειν, ἔνθα µηδὲν ἐνδεῖ µηδὲ ὑπερβάλλει.  
 
                                                 
27 The earliest known Rabbinic authority to implement Philo’s plan (though without reference to Philo) is 
Saadia Gaon: cf. Amir, “The Decalogue According to Philo,” 126–28; David Winston, “Philo and Rabbinic 
Literature,” in The Cambridge Companion to Philo (ed. Adam Kamesar; Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 247–48.   10 
How does Philo’s statement of the prohibition of single testimony relate to the 
formulations of the Pentateuch? As a commentator on Scripture, Philo’s sacred text is the 
Septuagint, but with the exception of the word µάρτυς, “witness”, he indicates no exact 
linguistic dependence on any of the formulations of the prohibition in LXX. This is to be 
expected. In the books of the Special Laws, Philo typically summarizes the laws rather 
than quoting from a Greek translation of Scripture.
28  
Furthermore, in Philo we have just one statement of the prohibition and not, as in 
the Pentateuch, three statements addressing different contexts. Philo says nothing about 
specific cases to which the prohibition of single testimony might apply. Indeed, his 
presentation seems to permit its application to any case, recalling the statement in LXX 
Deut 19:15 that “any matter” or “any word” will be established on the evidence of two or 
three witnesses, further emphasising the general principle that the prohibition of single 
testimony applies to “any wrongdoing… sin …[or] offence” (LXX Deut 19:15).  
  Philo’s presentation of the prohibition of single testimony here is characteristic of 
his approach in the books of Special Laws in that he transforms the direct statements and 
case laws of the Pentateuch into reports of the words of Moses. Thus, in Philo’s treatment 
of the special laws of the Ninth Commandment, he presents Moses as the implied subject 
who “exhorts (παραινεῖ)” (44); who “gives the name (προσαγορεύει)” of false prophet to 
diviners (51); and, in relation to our topic, who “added the clause (προσδιετάξατο)” 
prohibiting single testimony (53). These reports are followed by reflections on what Philo 
                                                 
28 Occasional examples of LXX language or echoes of such language in Special Laws Book 4 include: 
Spec. 4.59 (LXX Exod 23:1); 4.62 (LXX Exod 23:8); 4.66 (LXX Deut 16:20); 4.70 (LXX Deut 1:17; 
16:19); 4.71 (LXX Deut 1:17); 4.72 (LXX Exod 23:3). On the Greek text of the Bible cited by Philo in the 
Allegorical Commentary, and its relation to LXX: see Anna Passoni dell’Acqua, “Upon Philo’s biblical text 
and the Septuagint,” in Italian Studies on Philo of Alexandria (ed. Francesca Calabi; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 
25–52; Gregory E. Sterling, “Which version of the Greek Bible did Philo read?” (forthcoming).   11 
holds to be the marvellous logic inherent in the laws given by God through the prophet 
Moses, and the unity of these laws with the commandments of the Decalogue.   
   
The prohibition of single testimony and the Ninth Commandment 
In closing his treatment of the special laws of the Ninth Commandment, Philo tells us 
that, in addition to those laws that he has discussed under this heading, “there is much 
else which might be said about false witnesses and judges” (Spec. 4.78; cf. Decal. 138). 
But, as Philo puts it, to avoid speaking at great length (µακρηγορεῖν), he confines his 
discussion of the “special laws” of the Ninth Commandment to the following:  
 
1. Against consenting to an injustice, including the perversion of testimony (Exod 23:1–
2; Spec. 4.43–47).  
2. Against those who bear false witness against God, which Philo interprets in terms of 
diviners and the false prophet of Deuteronomy 18 (Deut 18:9–14, 15–22; Spec. 4.48–52).  
3. The prohibition of single testimony (Num 35:30; Deut 17:6; 19:15; Spec. 4.53–54).  
4. Various laws which, as Philo sees them, are addressed to judges and have the common 
goal of protecting judges from making a false decision (Spec. 4.55–77): “You shall not 
accept a groundless report. You shall not consent with the unjust person to be an unjust 
person” (LXX Exod 23:1; Spec. 4.59–61); “And you shall not take bribes. For bribes 
blind the eyes of those who see and corrupt just matters” (LXX Exod 23:8; cf. Deut 
16:19; Spec. 4.62–65); “You shall pursue justice justly…” (LXX Deut 16:20; Spec. 4.66–
69); “You shall not recognise the person when judging: like the small so you shall judge 
the great; you shall not shrink from the face of a person, for the judgment is God’s”   12 
(LXX Deut 1:17; Spec. 4.70–71); “And a poor person you shall not pity in a trial” (LXX 
Exod 23:3; Spec. 4.72–77). 
  It is striking that Philo does not include among the “special laws” of the Ninth 
Commandment any explicit reference to the law of Deut 19:16–21, which deals with the 
procedure for investigating and punishing false testimony. In the Special Laws, however, 
Philo seems not to be concerned with the fate of the false witness, but with the effect of 
the false witness on others. It is typical of Philo’s treatment of both the “special laws” 
and the commandments of the Decalogue to emphasise their application to society as a 
whole. In the wider context of Philo’s interpretation, the universal character of these laws 
befits laws that belong to the great universal Law of Nature, which, for Philo, is identified 
with the Jewish Legislation. The great danger of false testimony, as Philo explains in the 
Special Laws, is in its power to corrupt society as a whole; false testimony multiplies 
offences as the false witness “sins for the sake of another” (Spec. 4.42). False testimony, 
argues Philo, is designed to deceive judges and to make the latter become false witnesses 
themselves when they give judgments based on false testimony. It is in Philo’s 
concentration on judges and their duty to avoid giving false judgments that he may, I 
suggest, be seen to address Deuteronomy’s law on the treatment of false witnesses—
particularly the instruction that “the judges shall make a thorough investigation” (Deut 
19:18). 
  As for Philo’s explanation of the prohibition of single testimony (Spec. 4.53–54), 
his primary concern is to extol and explain its excellence. Thus, the prohibition is 
described as a “very fine (πάγκαλος)” or “all beautiful” example of Moses’ teaching, 
recalling Philo’s references to other Mosaic instructions as deserving the highest degree   13 
of admiration.
29 According to Philo, proof of the excellence of the prohibition of single 
testimony rests primarily on its role in combating false testimony, based on the notion 
that the single witness is a potential source of false testimony (“it is possible that a single 
person may see something wrongly, mishear something, or be deceived; for false 
opinions are countless and they can attack from countless sides”). This view is plausibly 
inspired by the juxtaposition in Deuteronomy 19 of the prohibition of single testimony 
(Deut 19:15) and the procedure for combating false testimony (Deut 19:16–21). 
  In contrast with the formulations of the witness laws in Deuteronomy, Philo 
focuses on the prohibition of single testimony without explicitly discussing the number of 
witnesses that constitutes sufficient testimony. This emphasis on the prohibition of one 
witness, I suggest, is determined by Philo’s overriding concern with the danger of false 
testimony represented by the single witness. As a special law of the Ninth 
Commandment, Philo argues, the prohibition of single testimony guards against the 
errors inherent in perceptions that are based on bodily senses. In this role, the prohibition 
of single testimony also guards against false testimony and false judgments that are based 
on false perceptions. Thus, Philo further establishes the relationship between the 
prohibition of single testimony and its “head” in the Ninth Commandment by appealing 
to the idea of the vulnerability of knowledge based on the senses (a lesson that Philo 
derives from many Mosaic teachings). 
  Philo also offers another explanation of the prohibition of single testimony, in 
which he addresses the implied question: Why are two or more witnesses better than one? 
To prohibit single testimony, explains Philo, is a matter of justice—“it is most unjust to 
accept one witness…” For Philo, the virtue of justice characterises all the 
                                                 
29 E.g. Fug. 168; Her. 10; Virt. 183.   14 
commandments, but especially those, like the Ninth Commandment, that are on the 
Second Table of the Decalogue.
30 Philo’s argument rests on the principle—which has a 
strong basis in ancient Greek oratory—that a group of witnesses has greater credibility 
than one witness alone.
31 The testimony of just one witness against several defendants 
cannot therefore be accepted as reliable. Similarly, justice cannot be done when only one 
witness testifies against one defendant; there is nothing to tip the balance on the scales of 
justice, and Philo recommends that one must “suspend judgment (ἐπέχειν)”, using the 
technical language of Sceptic and Stoic terminology. This final remark was no doubt 




Philo and other Jewish traditions 
Not much has been written on Philo’s treatment of the prohibition of single testimony, 
but what there is tends to focus on aspects of his presentation derived from Greek 
philosophical thought—seen in Philo’s distrust of the bodily senses and connection of the 
prohibition to the doctrine of suspending judgment “where there is neither lack nor 
excess”. What of Philo’s connection to the wider world of Jewish tradition? In important 
respects, Philo’s interpretation stands apart from other traditions. Only Philo describes 
the prohibition of single testimony as guarding against the deceptions of the body, or as 
                                                 
30 Cf. Decal.106; 138–40, etc. 
31 Cf. André Soubie, “Les Preuves dans les Plaidoyers des Orateurs Attiques I,” RIDA 20 (1973): 17–253 
(at 194f.); Soubie, “Les Preuves dans les Plaidoyers des Orateurs Attiques II,” RIDA 21 (1974): 77–134 
(125). 
32 Cf. Isaak Heinemann, “Ueber die Einzelgesetze IV. Buch,” in Die Werke Philos von Alexandria in 
deutscher Übersetzung (ed. Leopold Cohn; Breslau: Verlag von M.& H. Marcus, 1910), 263, n.1; Francis 
H. Colson, Philo VIII, 430. On Philo’s use of the idea of the “balance” in other contexts: Jaap Maansfeld, 
“Philosophy in the Service of Scripture: Philo’s Exegetical Strategies,” in The Question of “Eclecticism”: 
Studies in Later Greek Philosophy (ed. John M.Dillon and Anthony A. Long; Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1988), 70–102 (100–102).   15 
requiring the suspension of judgment. And in broader terms, the conception of the 
“special laws” given through Moses as “species” of the “genus” that is represented by 
each of the commandments of the Decalogue seems to begin with Philo. Nevertheless, 
there are also hints of connections to wider Jewish tradition.  
Firstly, Philo’s non-specific, potentially universalising application of the 
prohibition of single testimony is likely to reflect LXX Deut 19:15—according to which 
“any matter” (or “any word”) may be established by two or three witnesses. This is not 
surprising, given Philo’s dependence on LXX as the source for his interpretation of 
Scripture.  
Secondly, a much less expected connection: Philo’s association of the prohibition 
of single testimony with other laws dealing with false utterances seems closest to the kind 
of thematic arrangement of laws in the so-called “Deuteronomic Paraphrase” of the 
Temple Scroll (11QTemple
a LI:11–LXVI).
33 This source preserves a formulation of the 
prohibition of single testimony equivalent to Deut 19:15 (in 11QTemple
a LXI:6–7a). 
11QTemple
a may also have included an equivalent to Deut 17:6 (at the beginning of col. 
56), but if so it has been lost through damage to the scroll.
34 Deuteronomy’s requirement 
of “two or three witnesses” also appears in 11QTemple
a LXIV—where a new law, 
drawing on various pentateuchal laws, applies the demand for two or three witnesses to 
the specific case of treason. The focus for discussion here, however, is the prohibition of 
single testimony as represented in 11QTemple
a LXI: 
                                                 
33 Lawrence Schiffman, “The Deuteronomic Paraphrase of the Temple Scroll,” RevQ 15 (1991–92): 543–
68. 
34 Although an equivalent to Deut 17:6–7 is missing through damage to the top of col. LVI, Yadin’s 
reconstruction reveals adequate space for these verses. Col. LVI has 21 lines extant, 19 complete, in a 
column which may have included a total of 28 lines. See further Yigael Yadin, The Temple Scroll. Vol. 2: 
Text and Commentary (Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 1983), 250.   16 
   
07 “…[But the prophet who presumes]
35 
1 to sp[eak a word] in(?) [my na]me(?) [which I have n]ot commanded [him to] 
speak, or wh[o speaks in the name of o]ther go[ds,] 
2 that same prophet shall be put to death.”    And if you say {to}
36 in your  
heart, “[H]ow may we know the word 
3 which the Lord has not spoken?”—and when the prophet speaks in the name of 
the Lord, and the word does not come to pass  
4 or come true, that is a word which I have not spoken; the prophet has spoken it 
presumptuously, you (plural) are not to be afraid 
5 of him. 
6 A single witness shall not arise against a man for any wrongdoing or for any sin, 
with respect to any offence that may be committed; on the evidence of two  
7 witnesses or on the evidence of three witnesses shall a matter (or word) be 
established 
 
 Myn# yp l( )+xy r#) )+x lwklw Nww( lwkl #y)b dx) d( Mwqy )wl 
rbd Mwqy Myd( h#wl# yp l( w) Myd( 
 
If a malicious witness arises against any man to testify against  
8 him of defection, then the two parties to {the dispute} shall stand before me, 
and before the priests and the Levites and before 
9 the judges who shall be in office in those days; and the judges shall investigate, 
and if the witness is a false witness and has testified falsely 
10 against his brother, then you (singular) shall do to him just as he had meant to 
do to his brother; and you shall purge the evil from among you. 
11 And the rest shall hear, and be afraid, and they shall not {again} commit such 
an evil thing as this among you. Nor 
12 must your eye pity him: life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, 
foot for foot. 
 
(11Q Temple
a LXI:1–12, adapted from Yadin, The Temple Scroll) 
 
In relation to Philo’s account of the prohibition, 11Q Temple
a LXI presents a number of 
significant differences.  
                                                 
35 Yadin suggests reconstruction of 7 lines (01–07) for the missing top of col. LXI, corresponding to Deut 
18:14–20: Yadin, The Temple Scroll, 2:276. 
36 “{to}” corresponds to לא, cf. Yadin’s note: “[The scribe] first wrote  הככבל לא, then erased לא” (The 
Temple Scroll. Volume Two, 277).   17 
1) Unlike Philo, 11Q Temple
a represents a text very close to the traditional 
formulation of Deut 19:15 (MT): 
yn# yp l( )+xy r#) )+x lkb t)+x lklw Nw( lkl #y)b dx) d( Mwqy )l 
           rbd Mwqy Myd( h#l# yp l( w) Myd( 
 
 
2) Philo’s interpretation of the prohibition of single testimony as generally 
applicable may have been inspired by LXX Deut 19:15, which states that “any 
matter” or “any word” shall be established on the basis of two or more witnesses. 
On this point, 11Q Temple
a agrees with MT (“a matter” or “a word”) against 
LXX.  
3) In contrast with Philo, 11Q Temple
a explicitly represents the false witness rule 
of Deut 19:16–21, and places it after the prohibition of single testimony (= Deut 
19:15), matching the traditional order of the laws in Deuteronomy. However, this 
same order may be implicit in Philo’s selection of “special laws” concerning 
judges and their duty to guard against false witnesses and judgments, in the 
section following his treatment of the prohibition of single testimony.  
4) More generally, there are fundamental differences in the presentation of the 
laws by Philo and in 11Q Temple
a. Philo presents the “special laws” as given 
through Moses, the interpreter of divine words, while the Temple Scroll normally 
presents the same laws in the first person voice of God.
37 Perhaps this point 
should not be pressed here, since col. LXI of 11Q Temple
a does not explicitly 
present God as the speaker of the witness rules.  
                                                 
37 On the Temple Scroll’s characteristic formulation of pentateuchal texts in the first person to show that 
God is speaking: Yigael Yadin, The Temple Scroll. Vol. 1: Introduction (Jerusalem: Israel Exploration 
Society, 1983), 71–73.   18 
5) More generally still, we must recognise the key difference embodied in Philo’s 
organisation of the “special laws” in relation to the commandments of the 
Decalogue. This sets Philo apart from all other known exemplars of early 
Judaism, including 11Q Temple
a. 
 
So much for the differences. What of similarities or connections between Philo and 11Q 
Temple
a? The significant issue here is the context in which 11Q Temple
a locates the 




a LX:16–20: the prohibition of divination (cf. Deut 18:9–14);  
11Q Temple
a LX:21–LXI:5: criteria for recognising false prophets (cf. Deut 18:20–22);  
11Q Temple
a LXI:6–7: the prohibition of single testimony and the requirement for two or 
three witnesses (cf. Deut 19:15); 
11Q Temple
a LXI:7–12: the case of the false witness (cf. Deut 19:16–21). 
 
Commenting on the juxtaposition in 11Q Temple
a of statements about divination and 
false prophecy with the witness laws, Yigael Yadin, the great editor of this scroll 
observed: “The author [of the Temple Scroll] skipped Deuteronomy xix.1–14 and began 
directly with [Deuteronomy 19:15-16]”—because both the law of the false prophet and 
the prohibition of false testimony deal with capital punishment.
38 In the same context, 
Yadin also noted that the scroll’s “deletion” of Deut 19:1–13, concerning laws for the 
cities of refuge, is “interesting, for the scroll is altogether silent on that subject insofar as 
                                                 
38 Yadin, The Temple Scroll, 2:277–78.    19 
its text has been preserved”.
39 He concluded that the omission of the section on the cities 
of refuge is “in keeping with the editorial tactics of [the Temple Scroll]”
40—that is, what 
Yadin called “merging commands on the same subject”.
41 According to Yadin, then, 11Q 
Temple
a associates the law of the false prophet of Deuteronomy 18 with the witness laws 
of Deut 19:15–21 because of their shared concern with capital punishment. I would like 
to suggest that more could be said about “merging commands on the same subject” and 
the omission of the law on cities of refuge (Deut 19:1–13) and the prohibition of 
removing a boundary marker (Deut 19:14) in 11Q Temple
a. We might also see the 
construction of this part of 11Q Temple
a as an arrangement of laws around the common 
theme of false utterances—divination, false prophecy, and the false witness rule with 
which the prohibition of single testimony is associated. According to this view, 11Q 
Temple
a appears to present the prohibition of single testimony as part of a network of 
laws guarding against those who speak false words, against God or against fellow human 
beings.  
Philo’s arrangement of the “special laws” under the Ninth Commandment adopts 
the same order:  
 
Spec. 4.48: condemnation of divination (cf. Deut 18:9–14); 
Spec. 4.49–52: the false prophet (cf. Deut 18:20–22); 
Spec. 4.53–54: prohibition of single testimony (cf. Deut 19:15). 
 
                                                 
39 Yadin, The Temple Scroll, 2:278. 
40 Yadin, The Temple Scroll, 2:278. 
41 Yadin, The Temple Scroll, 1:73–74.   20 
Philo makes no mention here of the statements on the cities of refuge and the prohibition 
of removing a boundary marker, corresponding to Deut 19:1–14, but he moves directly 
from the subject of the false prophet to the prohibition of single testimony. This order, so 
far as I can discover, is found only in Philo and the Temple Scroll in ancient sources. 
  Whatever one makes of the date of the Temple Scroll, it represents an example of 
interpretation considerably earlier than Philo’s work. Philo may have been the first to 
fully articulate the relationship of the “special laws” to the Decalogue and to arrange 
them according to their relationship to one of the Ten Words. But Philo is also a man 
steeped in tradition. Besides his own contributions, he draws on interpretations taken 
from others. The challenge for students of Philo is to identify his sources (which some 
think a hopeless cause). I am not going to suggest that Philo knew the Temple Scroll. 
What I do think is that there seem to be some connections. Philo may have connected 
laws on divination, prophecy and witnesses, inspired by nothing more than the order of 
Deuteronomy, excluding the cities of refuge and the prohibition of removing a boundary 
mark, in order to connect these “special laws” with the Ninth Commandment. Or Philo 
may have known existing traditions of the kind we see in the Temple Scroll, bringing 
together laws on false utterances, to which Philo has added some more—in his sequence 
of “special laws” under the heading of the Ninth Commandment. 
  Writing in the 1930s, the English translator of Philo, Francis H. Colson, observed 
that Philo’s inclusion of laws on divination and false prophecy under the heading of the 
Ninth Commandment is “very strained”.
42 Had the Temple Scroll been available to 
Colson then, he might have seen things differently—and recognised the possibility, at 
                                                 
42 Francis H. Colson, Philo VIII (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939), 37, n. b.   21 
least, for making connections between Philo and the wider world of Jewish interpretation 
of Scripture.  